infozip.patch 1.5 KB

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  1. --- zip-2.32/unix/configure 2006-02-18 06:58:56 +0100
  2. +++ zip-2.32/unix/configure 2006-07-02 15:31:34 +0200
  3. @@ -50,15 +50,9 @@
  4. fi
  5. echo Check for the C preprocessor
  6. -# on SVR4, cc -E does not produce correct assembler files. Need /lib/cpp.
  7. -CPP="${CC} -E"
  8. -# solaris as(1) needs -P, maybe others as well ?
  9. -[ -f /usr/ccs/lib/cpp ] && CPP="/usr/ccs/lib/cpp -P"
  10. -[ -f /usr/lib/cpp ] && CPP=/usr/lib/cpp
  11. -[ -f /lib/cpp ] && CPP=/lib/cpp
  12. -[ -f /usr/bin/cpp ] && CPP=/usr/bin/cpp
  13. -[ -f /xenix ] && CPP="${CC} -E"
  14. -[ -f /lynx.os ] && CPP="${CC} -E"
  15. +# use the OpenPKG GCC cpp binary unconditionally,
  16. +# because on some platforms, the native one is broken
  17. +CPP="@l_cpp@"
  18. echo "#include <stdio.h>" > conftest.c
  19. $CPP conftest.c >/dev/null 2>/dev/null || CPP="${CC} -E"
  20. @@ -74,7 +68,7 @@
  21. echo "int foo() { return 0;}" > conftest.c
  22. $CC -c conftest.c >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
  23. echo Check if compiler generates underlines
  24. - nm conftest.o | grep "(^|[^_])foo" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
  25. + nm conftest.o | grep "[^_]foo" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
  26. [ $? -eq 0 ] && CPP="${CPP} -DNO_UNDERLINE"
  27. if eval "$CPP crc_i386.S > _crc_i386.s 2>/dev/null"; then
  28. if eval "$CC -c _crc_i386.s >/dev/null 2>/dev/null" && [ -f _crc_i386.o ]
  29. http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0282
  30. Directory traversal vulnerability in UnZip 5.50 allows attackers to
  31. overwrite arbitrary files via invalid characters between two . (dot)
  32. characters, which are filtered and result in a ".." sequence.